It might sound clich\u00e9 that cybersecurity is important in industrial environments, but with the level of connectivity that started in the 1990s \u2013 industrial control systems (ICS) have never been more connected than they are today.\u00a0 The good news is, it\u2019s easy to find the right network equipment, but the harder part is deploying them or re-architecting networks.<\/p>\n
So, for the audience, at work or conferences you might hear phases or terminology such as: the Perdue model, network layers, ISA95, ISA\/IEC62443, Deep-Packet-Inspection (DPI), NAT routers, industrial firewalls, network threats, and \u201cpassive anomaly detection\u201d.\u00a0 But what does it all mean to you?\u00a0 Does it add more risk than security or is it a fundamental part of any project (including building machine skids or cells)?\u00a0 If you program PLCs, write ladder logic, engineer solutions, or are a facilities electrician \u2013 this session is for both you and other experts (including networking professionals).<\/p>\n
This session will introduce the audience to:<\/p>\n
\u2022 The basics of industrial networking and packets
\n\u2022 Network layers and Purdue model\/ISA95 reference architectures
\n\u2022 ISA\/IEC 62443 network security concepts (zones and conduits)
\n\u2022 Deep-Packet-Inspection vs. other networking devices (including firewalls)
\n\u2022 Industrial wireless, OPC\/UA Gateways, and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT)
\n\u2022 Modern reference network designs that include security by design and common gotchas
\n\u2022 Where\/how network-based risk can be mitigated to tolerable levels<\/p>\n
—<\/strong><\/p>\n And with time permitting, we would do a demo of a Modbus TCP\/IP slave\/master communication, review of transmitted packets with Wireshark, and an exhibit using an industrial network firewall to enforce Read-Only access on a simulated PLC.<\/p>\n See the recording of the presentation on Youtube<\/p>\n